January 6, 2000. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A RULING BY THIS COURT AS TO THE ADDITION OF NEW DEFENDANTS WITHIN THIS ACTION DUE TO AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS ON AUGUST 30, 1999, SO AS TO PRESERVE PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, IN THIS ACTION
LAMBROS vs. FAULKNER et al., CIVIL CASE NO. 98-1621 (DSD/JMM)
I hereby state under the penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the following:
a. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A RULING BY THIS COURT AS TO THE ADDITION OF NEW DEFENDANTS WITHIN THIS ACTION DUE TO AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS ON AUGUST 30, 1999, SO AS TO PRESERVE PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, IN THIS ACTION, dated January 6, 2000.
was served on the following persons this 7th day of January, 2000, via U.S. Mail through the USP Leavenworth mailroom, to:
1. CLERK OF THE COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
316 North Robert Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1460
One original and one copy
U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL NO. Z-233-381-748
2. Attorney Donna Rae Johnson
Attorney No. 50945
Attorney for Defendant's
700 St. Paul Building
6 West Fifth Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
3. INTERNET RELEASE TO ALL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS
4. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Organization of American States
1889 F. Street, N.W.
RE: TO BE FILED WITH: JUNE 30, 1998, Complaint and released to all 35 countries that are members of the Organization of American States.
5. Judge Baltasar Garzon of the National Court of Madrid,
Garcia Gutierrez, #1
Madrid, Spain 28004
RE: TO BE FILED WITH: January 5, 1999, REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, mailed on January 7, 1999 and received by Judge Garzon on January 25, 1999.
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, #00436-124
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000, USA
Web site: www.brazilboycott.org
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
CHARLES W. FAULKNER, SUED AS ESTATE/WILL/BUSINESS INSURANCE OF DECEASED ATTORNEY CHARLES W. FAULKNER
ATTORNEY SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER
FAULKNER & FAULKNER
JOHN & JANE DOE'S
CIVIL ACTION NO.
Plaintiff JOHN GREGORY
LAMBROS, Pro Se, requests a ruling from this Court under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, RULE 18, JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND REMEDIES,
and any other applicable rules as to the addition of new
defendants within this action due to affidavits and exhibits
introduced by defendants on August 30, 1999, within defendants
"OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS," specifically the August
16, 1999, AFFIDAVIT OF MARC DIERSEN, so as to preserve Plaintiff's
due process rights under RES JUDICATA and COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL, in this action. Plaintiff is attempting to
consolidate all claims in one proceeding, if this court deems it
correct, so as not to split causes of action. See, FARRELL vs.
HOLLINGSWORTH, 43 F.R.D. 362 (D.C.S.C. 1968)(Inclusion of cause
of action for ABUSE OF PROCESS with one for
malicious prosecution, especially where
they arise out of the SAME TRANSACTION, is permissible under federal procedure.)
1. On August 30, 1999, Defendants filed with this Court there OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Included within the filing was the AFFIDAVIT OF MARC DIERSEN, the supervisor of the Abstract Division of the Ramsey County Department of Property Records and Revenue, dated August 16, 1999.
2. The exhibits attached to AFFIDAVIT OF MARC DIERSEN included the
COMMERCIAL LIEN filed by Plaintiff Lambros against the following parties:
a. FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL;
b. FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, President of Brazil;
c. CATHOLIC CARDEAL DOM JOSE FREIRO FALCAO;
d. LUIZ CARLOS ANDREACI;
e. FRANCESCO TOSCANINO, (500 F.2d 267 (1974));
f. FERNANDO COLLOR de MELLO, (Acting President of Brazil from
March 15 1990 to September 29, 1992. Chamber of Deputies
voted to impeach COLLOR on charges of corruption on
September 29, 1992);
g. ITAMAR FRANCO, (Acting President of Brazil on October 1, 1992).
3. The COMMERCIAL LIEN
filed against the above stated parties in paragraph two (2)
a. A SECURITY (15 U.S.C.) CLAIM OF COMMERCIAL LIEN AND AFFIDAVIT, dated August 27, 1996;
b. ADDENDUM TO LIEN NINETY (90) DAY NOTICE OF TIME LIMITATION, dated December 12, 1996;
C. NOTICE OF DEFAULT, dated May 1, 1997;
d. DEMAND FOR PAYMENT, dated June 18, 1997;
e. FINAL NOTICE FOR PAYMENT, December 17, 1997. (EXHIBIT A)
(Exhibits not attached to Exhibit A)
4. Violations of
law against the parties named within paragraph
two (2) that Plaintiff Lambros was subjected to included:
a. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN BRAZIL;
b. RIGHT TO ACCESS TO THE COURT IN BRAZIL;
C. RIGHT NOT TO BE TORTURED IN BRAZIL;
d. RIGHT NOT TO BE KIDNAPPED IN BRAZIL;
e. RIGHT TO BE FREE OF SLAVERY IN BRAZIL;
f. RIGHT TO BE FREE OF INVOLUNTARY RELIGIOUS SERVITUDE IN BRAZIL;
g. RIGHT TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER WHILE INCARCERATED IN BRAZIL;
h. RIGHT TO A TOILET TO SIT ON WHILE DEFECATING WHILE INCARCERATED IN BRAZIL; HANCOCK vs. AVERY, 301 F.Supp. 786 (1969);
i. RIGHT TO BE GIVEN DUE PROCESS OF ALL LAWS CONTAINED WITHIN THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S. & BRAZIL.
5. BRAZILIAN PERSONS
to also be included are the attorneys that
represented Plaintiff Lambros at one time or another due to his arrest in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil in 1991 due to his PAROLE VIOLATION WARRANT issued by the
United States Parole Commission:
a. CARLOS ROBERTO SCHLESINGER, Attorney Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;
b. NELIO ROBERTO SEIDL MACHADO, Attorney Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;
C. RUY LUDOLF RIBEIRO, Attorney Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;
d. VERNON DALE McNAMEE, Attorney Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
6. The above stated BRAZILIAN ATTORNEYS offered incorrect legal advice
and where aware of the torture Plaintiff experienced during his incarceration in
Brazilia, Brazil, as to his extradition to the United States.
7. Plaintiff has fulfilled the notification of the parties listed
within paragraph two (2) by PROCESS OF SERVICE BY PUBLICATION and RULE 4 FRCP,
as outlined within EXHIBIT A. SF( Also., RENCHARD vs. HUMPHREYS & HARDING, INC.,
59 F.R.D. 530 (D.C.D.C. 1973) (In action brought by a District of Columbia resident
OF BRAZIL for damages to his home allegedly resulting from
construction of BRAZILIAN EMBASSY, SERVICE OF SUMMONS and
COMPLAINT UPON GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL by registered mail delivery
to Minister of External Relations in Brazilia and by registered mail
delivered to the Brazilian embassy in the District of Columbia were
reasonably calculated to provide adequate notice of action and
BOTH METHODS OF SERVICE WERE VALID.)
8. Plaintiff Lambros asserts continued prejudice resulting from the parties listed in paragraphs two (2) and five (5).
9. Plaintiff Lambros asserts that the parties in paragraph two (2) HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO PLAINTIFF LAMBROS' COMMERCIAL LIEN, thus failure to deny is AN ADMISSION OF GUILT. As this Court understands, no more than a lawful affidavit is necessary to generate a PRIMA FACIE case. See, U.S. vs. KIS, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981); U.S. vs. POWELL, 379 US at 57-58.
10. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit APPROVED AND ALLOWED THE USE OF THE "COMMON LAW LIEN" that was filed in the deed records office in Denton, Texas against a criminal investigator with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service. See, U.S. vs. REEVES, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985). When, as a practical matter, legal remedy may be inadequate because it operates too slowly, self-help remedy provided by LIEN is allowed under Illinois law. See, LAKE RIVER CORP. vs. CARBORUNDUM CO., 769 F.2d 1284 (1985). A COMMON LAW LIEN is a mere right in one man to retain that which is in his/her possession belonging to another until certain demands of the person in possession are satisfied. See, BELL vs. DENNIS, 93 P.2d 1003, 1005, 43 N.M. 350. Commercial liens are commercial paper and negotiable instruments. Commercial liens imply a debt in the absence of any lawful money.
RES JUDICATA & COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:
11. A basic principle of
the U.S. legal system is that once something is decided, it should
stay decided; the same parties are not permitted to litigate the same
issues over and over. To prevent this, the legal system developed the
doctrines of RES JUDICATA and COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL,
which apply in virtually all types of legal actions. These
doctrines are sometimes referred to as, "claim preclusion" and "issue
12. RES JUDICATA (Latin for "thing decided") means that you cannot bring a lawsuit if there has already been a judgement on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies. See, LAWLOR vs. NATIONAL SCREEN SERVICE, 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1954); WILLIAMS vs. CODD, 459 F. Supp. 804, 811-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. If any of the following conditions do not exist, then res judicata DOES NO APPLY and the second suit is not barred:
a. JUDGEMENT ON THE MERITS. In a civil case, a judgement is
on "on the merits" if it decides the question of whether the
plaintiff's legal rights were violated by the defendant(s).
A judgement is not on the merits if the court holds it does
not have jurisdiction, that the case is moot, or anything
else unrelated to the legal claim concerning the case.
b. COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
C. THE SAME PARTIES OR THEIR PRIVIES.
d. THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION. The meaning of "cause of action"
is not precise, but as a practical matter, any significant
difference between the FACTUAL ISSUES in the first and second
lawsuits may mean they are not the same cause of action. See,
LANDRIGAN vs. CITY OF WARWICK, 628 F.2d 736, 741 (lst Cir. 1980).
Different legal claims arising out of the same facts may still
amount to the same cause of action. Some courts have held that
all claims that could have been brought in one suit are barred
by res judicata. The Supreme Court has not decided this question.
See, ALLEN vs. McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90, 97 n.10 (1980).
ESTOPPEL is the principle that you cannot relitigate
factual or legal issues which were actually litigated and decided in
a prior suit involving Plaintiff. regardless of whether the same
cause of action was previously litigated. See, LAWLOR vs. NATIONAL
SCREEN SERVICE, 349 U.S. 322, 326
15. If it is impossible to tell what was litigated and decided in a prior action, collateral estoppel CANNOT APPLY. See, RUSSELL vs. PIACE, 94 U.S. 606 (1876).
16. The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of proof as to what was litigated and decided. See, HERNANDEZ vs. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. Collateral estoppel also cannot apply unless the prior judgement
was based on a full and fair OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE. See, ALLEN vs. McCURRY,
449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). Circumstances that may VIOLATE THIS REQUIREMENT are
lack of COMPETENT REPRESENTATION, See, CERBONE vs. COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 508
F.Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), lack of any representation at all, UNFAIR LIMITS
ON WHAT ISSUES could be pursued or what EVIDENCE COULD BE PRESENTED, or Plaintiff's
failure to receive adequate notice of the hearing or motion upon which the court
based its decision.
18. Collateral estoppel also cannot apply if an issue was previously decided but the ruling on that issue was not necessary to the decision in the prior case - i.e., if it was "dicta." See, HYMAN vs. REGENSTEIN, 258 F. 2d 502, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1958).
19. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL COMPARED TO RES JUDICATA, as defined by BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY: "[Res judicata" bars relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties where there is a prior judgement, whereas "collateral estoppel" bars relitigation of a particular issue or determinative fact. See, ROPERvs. MABRY, 15 Wash.App. 819, 551 P.2d 1381, 1384.
20. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Lambros requests this Court for a RULING as to the addition of parties listed within paragraphs two (2) and five (5)
of this action, so as to
preserve Plaintiff Lambros' due process rights under RES JUDICATA
and COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, in this action. Again, this
Plaintiff is attempting to consolidate all claims in one proceeding,
if this court deems it correct, so as not to split causes of action.
Plaintiff believes the ultimate question before this court is:
"WHERE CAUSES OF ACTION IN BRAZIL, AS TO PLAINTIFF'S ARREST THRU
EXTRADITION, PART OF THE SAME TRANSACTION AS THOSE IN THE UNITED
STATES DURING HIS TRIAL?"
21. 1 JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1746.
EXECUTED ON: January 6, 2000
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, Pro Se
Reg. No. 00436-124
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000
For more information write (snail mail) JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS directly at:
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
Prisoner No. 00436-124
U. S. Penitentiary Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, KS 66048-1000
THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN MY BOYCOTT OF BRAZILIAN PRODUCTS.