May 11, 1999, Plaintiff Lambros' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (one page) and PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT AND REQUESTED ORDER DATED APRIL 26, 1999, (23 pages), in LAMBROS vs.FAULKNER, Civil No. 98-1621. Total of twenty-five (25) pages including Certificate of Service. NO EXHIBITS SCANNED.



I hereby state under the penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the attached:

a. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME, dated May 11, 1999;


c. EXHIBITS, dated May 11, 1999.

was served the 12th day of May, 1999, to the following

U.S. Courthouse
Warren E. Burger Federal Building
316 North Robert Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1460
One original and two copies
U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL NO. Z-437-761-4039

2. Attorney Donna Rae Johnson
Attorney Deborah Ellis
700 St. Paul Building
6 West Fifth Street
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101


4. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Organization of American States
1889 F. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 USA
U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL NO. Z-437-761-402
RE: TO BE FILED WITH: JUNE 30, 1998, Complaint and released to all 35 countries that are members of the Organization of American States.

5. Judge Baltasar Garzon of the National Court of Madrid, Spain
Audiencia National
Garcia Gutierrez, #1
Madrid, Spain 28004
RE: TO BE FILED WITH: January 5, 1999, REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, mailed on January 7, 1999 and received by Judge Garzon on January 25, 1999.


USP Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000, USA

End of page 1










98-1621 (DSD-JMM)


Plaintiff, JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, requests a ten (10) day extension of time to complete, "PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT AND REQUEST ORDER DATED APRIL 26, 1999." Therefore, an extension of time until May 24, 1999.

Plaintiff has submitted to this court his response to the first Five (5) claims, twenty-three (23) pages, to prove that plaintiff is trying to respond in an orderly fashion and has outlined plaintiff's problem in accessing the total of 24 typewriters in the law and leisure library for a population of over 1,800 inmates within paragraphs 41 and 42.

Plaintiff thanks this court for favorable consideration.

DATED: May 11, 1999.

Reg. No. 00436-124
USP Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000 USA

 End of page 2










98-1621 (DSD-JMM)


COMES NOW, John Gregory Lambros, Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, stating in AFFIDAVIT FORM, opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgement, Memorandum in Support, and requested Order, all dated April 26, 1999, and signed by Defendants' attorneys, Donna Rae Johnson and Deborah Ellis. Please note, none of the above documents where in affidavit form or signed by any of the defendants' listed within the heading of this action. See, KAUFFMAN vs. JOHNSON, 454 F.2d 264 (3rd Cir. 1972) (all statements made by defendants' counsel in briefs CANNOT BE BASES OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.)

JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS declares under penalty of perjury:

1. I am the plaintiff in this above-entitled case. I make this declaration in the opposition to defendants' attorneys pleadings dated April 26, 1999, in this action.

End of page 3

2. Plaintiff Lambros denies each and every material allegation contained in the above-entitled pleadings dated April 26, 1999, except as hereinafter may be expressed and specifically admitted.


3. Plaintiff discovered this week that the Defendants insurance companies that carried the legal malpractice insurance had a duty to defend the insurance companies interests. See, SACHS vs. ST. FIRE & MARINE INS. CO, 303 F.Supp. 1339 (1969). As per this plaintiff's reading, both the attorneys for the insurance companies and the insurance companies of 5. A MOTION TO DISMISS, Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether, based only on what is said in the complaint, the plaintiff possibly could be entitled to relief. Courts do not determine whether the facts Plaintiff states are true, but instead assume the truth of Plaintiff's factual statements and decides whether ' should be listed as defendants in this action. See, David J. Meiselman's book, "ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE," (1980), by The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company; (EXHIBIT A) (Lambros' May 3, 1999, letter to Attorney Ellis and Johnson)



4. It is this Plaintiff's understanding that most courts do not in general favor Rule 12(b)(6) MOTIONS TO DISMISS, because the policy of the federal rules is to allow cases to proceed if there is any reasonable chance that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Thus, the federal courts require the defendants' to make a very strong showing before a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

5. A MOTION TO DISMISS, Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether, based only on what is said in the complaint, the plaintiff possibly could be entitled to relief. Courts do not determine whether the facts Plaintiff states are true, but instead assume the truth of Plaintiff's factual statements and decides whether

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Plaintiff may have a claim that could lead to relief. As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a federal court

must "take as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." See, WARSHAW vs. XOMA, 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleading that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." SCHEUER vs. RHODES, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Rather, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." CONLEY vs. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)

6. This plaintiff is a pro se prisoner that is obstructed by dis functional Brazilian Government Officials that interfere with this plaintiff's mind thus obstructing justice in altering plaintiff's thought process due to brain control implants that where placed within plaintiff's skull during his extradition from Brazil to the U.S.. This court and defendants' must remember that the average dysfunctional Brazilian only has a fifth or sixth grade education and no value system, as Hitler took control of the Catholic Church when he secured South America's military dictators. See, HAINES vs. KERNER, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). ([pro se prisoners] "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . .")

7. Courts should not dismiss a pro se pleading unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies in the pleading cannot be cured by amendment. See, KARIM-PANAHI vs. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPT., 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, this court should advise this pro se plaintiff about the defects in the complaint to assist plaintiff in filing an amendment. See, NOLL vs. CARLSON, 809

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F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1987)(before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. . . . "Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous errors.") quoting, KARIM-PANAHI, 839 F.2d at 623-24.


8. To survive a MOTION TO DISMISS under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint need only outline a recognized legal or equitable claim which sufficiently pinpoints the TIME, PLACE, and CIRCUMSTANCES of the alleged occurrence and which, if proven, will justify some form of relief. See, DOROTHY K. WINSTON & CO. vs. TOWN HEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT INC., 376 F. Supp. 1214 (D. DC 1974) later proceeding 68 FRD 431, 21 FR Serv2d 100 (D DC 1975); MELO-SONIC CORP vs. CROPP, 342 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. PA 1965) (test is legal sufficiency not probability of success.)

9. Thus, a complaint should not be dismissed merely because the Plaintiff's allegations do not support the particular legal theory advanced; the court will examine the allegations to determine whether they call for RELIEF ON ANY POSSIBLE THEORY. See, HADDOCK vs. BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. Cal 1985); IN RE LONGHORN SECURITIES LITIGATION, 573 F.Supp. 278 (WD Okla 1983) later proceeding GATZ vs. SOUTHWEST BANK OF OMAHA, 836 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. Neb 1988) Court obliged to determine whether allegation in complaint supports relief on ANY POSSIBLE THEORY].

10. Neither should dismissal be ordered because all of the ELEMENTS THAT GIVE RISE TO A LEGAL BASIS FOR RECOVERY HAVE NOT BEEN STATED. See, WILLIAMS vs. UNITED STATES CREDIT PLAN INC., 526 F.2d 713, 21 FR Serv2d 320 (5th Cir. La 1976); BRAMLET vs. WILSON, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. Ark 1974)

11. However, the complaint must set forth sufficient information to

End of page 6

allow the court to determine if there is any recognized legal theory upon which relief can be granted. See, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA vs. AIR FLORIDA INC., 243 App DC 1, 750 F.2d 1077 (1984).


12. Any party may apply to the Court to have a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) heard and determined before trial. With respect to PRO SE COMPLAINTS, which the Supreme Court has held are subject to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers. DISMISSAL WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OFFENDS DUE PROCESS AND IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. See, HAINES vs. KERNER, 404 US 519 (1972) reh den 405 US 948 (1972).


13. The defendants' in this action have raised an EXPIRATION OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS as to DEFENDANT ATTORNEY C.W. FAULKNER'S ESTATE as prescribed by Minnesota Statute Section 524.3-801(a), further stating that state law is controlling according to Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. PLEASE NOTE Defendants S.R. Faulkner, Faulkner & Faulkner, John & Jane Does, attorneys for the insurance companies and insurance companies are not raising this defense. The attorneys in this action have not released the names of the attorneys for the insurance companies nor the insurance companies of the defendants' named in this action. The insurer has a duty to defend.

14. Defendants are correct in raising an expiration of a statute of limitations claim under a MOTION TO DISMISS, Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6), when the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint. See, COLUMBIA PETROLEUM INC. vs. WADDELL, 680 F. Supp. 1348 (WD Mo. 1987); CROSS vs. LUCIUS, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. La 1983), Key notes 2 & 3, (K.N. #2, [Al statute

End of page 7

of limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, BUT defense is subject to traditional rule that motion cannot be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.) (K.N. #3, [I]n view of fact that civil rights statutes contain no limitation provision, when a statute of limitations defense is raised to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court looks to analogous state statutes to determine whether action is time barred, as long as APPLICATION OF STATUTES IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL POLICIES.) The defendants in this case must prove that the running of Minnesota Statute Sec. 524.3-801(a) is apparent on the face of Plaintiff's complaint.

15. Defendants' also request this court to sign an ORDER in this action that states, "PLAINTIFF'S MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA." See, ORDER, page 2, Conclusions of Law, 112.

16. Defendants' are also correct in raising the defense of RES JUDICATA within a MOTION TO DISMISS, Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim as long as the DEFENSE APPEARS ON THE FACE OF THE COMPLAINT. See, WILLIAMS vs. MURDOCH,330 F.2d 745 (3rd Cir. 1964); GUAM INVESTMENT CO. vs. CENTRAL BUILDING INC., 288 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. Guam 1961).


17. As this court knows, Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b) provides that if, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgement and disposed of as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56. See, JENSEN vs. KLECKER, 599 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. ND 1979) later app 648 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1981 ).

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THIS COURT MAY DISREGARD MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS IF IT CHOOSES, WEIDEN FELLER vs. KIDULIS, 380 F.Supp. 445 (ED Wis 1974), but if matters outside the pleadings are considered, the court's action on the motion, regardless of how it characterizes the ruling, is a summary judgement. See, BOSSARD vs. EXXON CORP., 559 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 US 934 (1978).

18. This Court need not convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgement if it considers an exhibit attached to a pleading that is considered part of the pleading for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 10(c). See, SOLIS-RAMIREZ ex rel SOLIS vs. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 758 F.2d 1426 (llth cir. Fla 1985); FUDGE vs. PENTHOUSE INTERNATIONAL LTD., 840 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. RI 1988) cert. denied, 488 US 821 (1988).

19. When a motion to dismiss under Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) is converted to a motion for summary judgement, this court must give reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Thus, offering nonmoving party, "reasonable opportunity" to submit outside material. See, NATIONAL ASSOC. OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURES INC. vs. AYERST LABORATORIES, DIVISION OF/AND AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP., 850 F.2d 904 (2nd Cir. NY 1988).

20. Any affidavits submitted in this action must be based on personal knowledge, not hearsay. Again, all statements by defendants' counsel in briefs CANNOT BE BASES OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT. See, KAUFFMAN vs. JOHNSON, 454 F.2d 264 (3rd Cir. 1972).

21. This plaintiff has not had an opportunity to complete discovery and the defendants' have not yet complied fully to discovery requests. Therefore, this plaintiff requests that this court deny, or at least stay, the defendants' request/motion for summary judgement until plaintiff has obtained the necessary information. See, COSTLOW vs. U.S., 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3rd Cir. 1977); MADYUN vs.

End of page 9

vs. THOMPSON, 484 F. Supp. 619 (C.D. ILL 1980). "[W]here the facts are in the possession of the moving party, a continuance of a motion for summary judgement should be granted as a matter of course." See, COSTLOW vs. U.S., id. at 564. See also, NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. vs. SOLOMON, 529 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1976) (per curiam)(courts are particularly reluctant to grant summary judgement where there has been no opportunity for pretrial discovery).


22. To establish a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) acts constituting negligence or breach of contract, (3) that those acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages, and (4) that but for the defendant's conduct the plaintiff would have succeeded in the prosecution or defense of the action. BLUE WATER CORP. vs. O'TOOLE, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983). A Plaintiff shouldld submit expert testimony to establish the standard of care applicable to the attorney except where the jury otherwise can evaluate the relevant conduct. HILL vs. OKAY CONSTR., 312 Minn. 324, 327, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977). The issue of CAUSATION is generally a fact question, but causation becomes a question of LAW where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result. FRIESEN'S, INC. vs. LARSON, 438 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Minn. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 443 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1989). Failure to prove any one element of a legal malpractice claim defeats recovery. BLUE WATER, 336 N.W.2d at 282. Quoting, BOITNOTT vs. CASCARANO, 1996 WL 523816 (Minn. App.)


23. Defendants' claim in paragraph one (1) that pursuant to Rule 12 (h)(l) and (h)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P., the court lacks jurisdiction over the untimely claim filed against ATTORNEY CHARLES FAULKNER'S' ESTATE as prescribed by Minnesotaa

End of page 10

Statute Sec. 524.3-801(a) which states law is controlling according to RULE 17(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., as all claims were required to be filed no later than March 31, 1998. In fact, THIS IS NOT TRUE, due to the following:

a. Plaintiff served Defendants' FAULKNER & FAULKNER, C.W. FAULKNER, S.R. FAULKNER on October 20, 1997, via U.S. Certified Mail, a COMMERCIAL LIEN AND AFFIDAVIT and PARTIAL LIST OF PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED (defendants' home at 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110) as to LEGAL MALPRACTICE. Defendants home should of been art of Attorney Charles Faulkner's' ESTATE. Please refer to Exhibits O-1 thru 0-12 within Plaintiff's June 17, 1998, Declaratory Judgement/Complaint.

b. Plaintiff also filed follow-up NOTICES as to the COMMERCIAL LIEN and property seizure on February 13, 1998, and April 6, 1998. Please refer to paragraph 43 thru 46 within Plaintiff's June 17, 1998, Declaratory Judgement/ Complaint and attached exhibits. IN ADDITION, the RAMSEY COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, Abstract Division, Secretary of State for Minnesota and TRW Information Systems and Services were served. TRW is one of the big three credit reporting agencies in the United States, thus ANY CREDIT CHECK WOULD DISCLOSE PLAINTIFF'S COMMERCIAL LIEN.

c. Plaintiff also served the CLERK OF THE COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA on February 13, 1998, with copy of plaintiff's NOTICE OF DEFAULT, as per plaintiff's COMMERCIAL LIEN, to be placed with criminal file CR-4-89-82(05). Again plaintiff served another credit reporting agency, experian, so as to record plaintiff's commercial lien. Experian is one of the big three credit reporting agencies. See, Exhibit P-1 thru P-7 within Plaintiff's June 17, 1998, Declaratory Judgement/Complaint.

d. Defendant S.R. Faulkner, the personal representative of C.W. Faulkner's estate, RECEIVED NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AND DID NOT RESPOND. See, ANDERSON vs. U.S., 724 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1983) (appellant] cannot be allowed to pick and choose what mail he accepts and refuses . . ., and

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then claim no notice of mail he refused.); HIGGINS vs. PORT OF NEWPORT, 121 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997)(Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as particular situation demands, USCA Const. Amend. 5, 14)(Aires concedes that he had ACTUAL NOTICE that the Port INTENDED to sell his boat, but never contested the amount due or presented objections to the Port Manager as he could have done. On these facts, we conclude that Aires received all the process that is constitutionally "due," and, as we have jurisdiction, 28 USC §1291, we affirm.) (As the court explained in MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS & WATER DIVISION vs. CRAFT, 436 U.S. 1, n.17, "Lt[he OPPORTUNITY for informal consultation with designated personal empowered to correct a mistaken determination constitutes a 'due process hearing in appropriate circumstances." In any event, having not availed himself of the chance to complain or to challenge the charges before the Port Manager, Aires "can hardly expect that his argument on the severity of deprivation will carry much weight." MITCHELL vs. W.T. GRANT CO., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 40 L.Ed2d 406 (1974); COOK vs. CARLSON, 364 F.Supp. 24 (SD 1973) (K.N. #3, Primary purpose of mechanics' and materialmen's LIEN is to provide construction contractors with security, and a second purpose is to GIVE NOTICE to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers that there is a charge on the property and they will take subject to that charge.)

e. Plaintiff Lambros is incarcerated at the U.S. Federal Prison in Leavenworth, Kansas and does not subscribe to any Ramsey County, St. Paul, Minnesota publication. Thus, unable to receive NOTICE of Attorney Faulkner's claim that all claims were required to be filed no later than March 31, 1998, as to the ESTATE.

f. Defendants' state that RULE 17(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs lack of jurisdiction over the untimely filed claims against Defendant C.W. Faulkner's estate. Federal Rule 17(b) dealing with CAPACITY of parties to bring an action DOES NOT affect SURVIVABILITY or ASSIGNABILITY of

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cause of action. See, ISIDOR WEINSTEIN INVESTMENT CO. vs. HEARST CORP., 303 F.Supp. 646 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ([F]irst, that assignability of the cause of action is a question of standing rather than capacity and that therefore Rule 17(b), F.R.Civ.P. DOES NOT CONTROL; second, that the issue of assignability is to be determined by FEDERAL rather than state law and that California law is therefore not controlling.) (The rule under consideration Rule 11(b)] DEALS WITH CAPACITY to bring an action and does not affect survivability or assignability of a cause of action . . . "CAPACITY" raises only the question of whether the plaintiff is free from general disability such as infancy, insanity or some other form of incompetency, or if he sues in a representative capacity, whether he actually possesses the character in which he sues. Consequently Rule 17 is not at issue. "Cause of action" and "capacity to sue" are different concepts. "Capacity to sue," as stated, is plaintiff's personal right to come into court; his "cause of action" is his right to relief under the facts.)

g. Attorney Charles W. Faulkner is liable in his INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY DUE TO HIS PARTNERSHIP IN FAULKNER & FAULKNER, as all correspondence to Plaintiff, U.S. Attorney's Office and the Court was conducted on STATIONARY with the heading of FAULKNER & FAULKNER, listing both Attorney Charles W. Faulkner and Attorney Sheila Regan Faulkner, as partners. Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, RULE 7.5(d) states, "LAWYERS MAY STATE OR IMPLY THAT THEY PRACTICE IN A PARTNERSHIP OR OTHER ORGANIZATION ONLY WHEN THAT IS FACT." RULE 7.5(a) states, "A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE A FIRM NAME, LETTERHEAD, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATION THAT VIOLATES RULE 7.1." See, Exhibit H, Plaintiff's June 17, 1998, Declaratory Judgement/Complaint. The UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, sets forth the generally accepted rule that a partnership and EACH MEMBER THEREOF, is responsible for the tortious conduct of its members, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE and ratification, if the wrongful partner was acting within the reasonable scope of the firm's

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business. See, SMYTH vs. HARVIE, (1863) 31 Ill 62; DOUGLAS RESERVOIRS WATERS USERS ASSOC. vs. MAURER & GARST, (1965, Wyo) 398 P2d 74. The test, therefore, is whether the wrong was committed within the reasonable scope of partnership business and within the apparent authority of that particular partner who committed the wrong. See, 60 Am Jur, Partnership, §5 162-163. Evidence that an attorney's name appeared on an office door with the name of the attorney's partner, . . . that the attorney used partnership STATIONARY, was sufficient to support a jury conclusion that the attorney was a partnership by estoppel and that the partnership had ratified the attorney's fraudulent acts, thereby making itself liable to the client for compensatory and punitive damages. See, BONAVIRE vs. WAMPLER, 779 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1985).

h. Therefore, Attorney C.W. Faulkner is still INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE under the partnership of FAULKNER & FAULKNER, as suit against partner of a dissolved partnership is not precluded merely by dissolution of FAULKNER & FAULKNER PARTNERSHIP, See, SITCHENKO vs. DIRESTA, 512 F.Supp. 758 (ED NY 1981) (It is significant that defendants do not assert that the Partnership is "WOUND UP," but rather that they have not engaged in "WINDING UP ACTIVITIES" since 1978. In any event, in the light of plaintiff's unresolved claim, it is questionable whether the Partnership's affairs could be considered to be completely wound up.) (Rule 19(a), F.R.Civ.P., provides, "A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall party if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be afforded among be joined as those already parties . . . If he has been joined, the court shall order that he be a party."; U.S. vs. HANKINS, 581 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1978) Key note #4, (Under Mississippi law, when partner dies, in the absence of a prior agreement providing for the continuation of partnership after death, the partnership is dissolved, BUT DISSOLUTION DOES NOT MEAN THE PARTNERSHIP THEREBY INSTANTANEOUSLY

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DISAPPEARS; for various purposes, IT CONTINUES T0 LIVE UNTIL IT IS LAWFULLY SOLD OR ITS AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN LAWFULLY WOUND UP, and the surviving partner does not become the sole proprietor of the partnership or its assets.); MATTER OF MONTGOMERY, 532 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1976) (In a broad sense, general partners are INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE for tax obligations of partnership.); SINGER HOUSING CO. vs. SEVEN LAKES VENTURE, 466 F.Supp. 369 (D.Colorado 1979) (Acts of one partner binds the partner ship, and once partnership is bound, EACH INDIVIDUAL PARTNER IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE for all debts and obligations incurred by the partnership.)

i. Minnesota Statute of Limitations for legal malpractice action is SIX (6) YEARS. See, SABES & RICHMAN INC. vs. MUENZER, 431 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

j. InFELDER vs. CASEY, 101 L Ed2d 123, 138 (1988), the Supreme Court REJECTED the application of a 120 DAY STATE NOTICE OF CLAIM LIMITATIONS as a prerequisite to the enforcement of FEDERAL RIGHTS IN STATE COURT, reasoning: "Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, "[the relative importance conflict with a valid to the State of its own law is NOT MATERIAL when there is federal law," for "any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is CONTRARY TO FEDERAL LAW, MUST YIELD." (quoting, FREE vs. BLAND, 369 US 663, 666 (1962)) Accord: HURON PORTLAND CEMENT CO. vs. DETROIT, 362 US 440, 443-44 (1960). Please refer to PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS', dated January 5, 1999, paragraphs 55 thru 60, pages 10 thru 12.

K. Title 28, Section 1652, STATE LAWS AS RULES OF DECISION, states, "The Law of the several states, EXCEPT WHERE THE CONSTITUTION OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OR ACTS OF CONGRESS OTHERWISE REQUIRE or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in CIVIL ACTIONS in the courts of the U.S., in cases where they apply." Also, State law cannot contract or enlarge federal jurisdiction. See, POITRA vs. DEMARRIAS, 502 F.2d 23, 26-27 (8th Cir. 1974).

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24. Defendants' claim in paragraph two (2), that pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that there are no material facts in dispute and the the defendants' are entitled to judgement as a matter of law on plaintiff's malpractice and RICO claims. In fact, THIS IS NOT TRUE, due to the following:

a. IMPROPER CONCLUSION(s) OF LAW make an attorney liable to his client. See, HILL vs. OKAY CONSTR. CO. 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977); Failure of an attorney to take steps to reduce a sentence in excess of the maximum penalty constitutes negligence. See, GEDDIE vs. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO. (La. App.) 354 So.2d 718; Trial counsel's misrepresentation of the MAXIMUM PENALTY ON COUNTS OF INDICTMENT, which defendant pled guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and warranted an evidentiary hearing. See, PITTS vs. U.S., 763 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985); Trial counsel's failure to advise defendant of MAXIMUM PENALTY, constitutes deficient performance. See, TEAQUE vs. SCOTT, 60 F.3d 1167 (5th Cir. 1995); Trial counsel failed to explain to defendant his POSSIBLE CAREER OFFENDER STATUS and MISADVISED defendant of the MAXIMUM SENTENCE HE COULD RECEIVE under the Guidelines if defendant proceeded to trial. Thereafter, based on counsel's advice, defendant rejected the five (5) year PLEA OFFER by the government and was convicted at trail and received a twenty-two (22) year sentence. Defendant conceded that he was notified of the terms of the PLEA BARGAIN; however, he alleged that the ADVICE THAT HE RECEIVED WAS SO INCORRECT AND SO INSUFFICIENT THAT IT UNDERMINED HIS ABILITY TO MAKE AN INTELLIGENT DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE OFFER. The Third Circuit found defendant stated a Sixth Amendment claim. See, U.S. vs. DAY, 969 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1992); Defendants' lawyer was ineffective in failing to conduct a minimal research of the applicable statute governing PAROLE ELIGIBILITY FOR A SECOND OFFENDER, plus counsel's failure to give accurate advice REGARDING PAROLE ELIGIBILITY, which was AN INTEGRAL FACTOR IN DEFENDANTS' PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, constituted ineffective

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assistance of counsel rendering the guilty plea involuntary. The HILL Court, further found that HILL DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED OR GIVEN A SHORTER SENTENCE AT TRIAL. See, HILL vs. LOCKHART, 877 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1989); A defendant has a right to conflict-free representation during guilty PLEA NEGOTIATIONS which includes investigations. See, Moore vs. U.S., 950 F.2d 656 (lOth Cir. 1991); U.S. Supreme Court Justice J. Marshall, joined by Douglas and Brennan stated, "[s]ince an ATTORNEY representing an accused should be REQUIRED TO INVESTIGATE AS TO, AND INFORM THE ACCUSED OF, POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROSECUTION BEFORE CONSIDERING A PLEA BARGAIN BEFORE ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, . . ." See, TOLLETT vs. HENDERSON, 36 L. Ed 2d 235, 236 (1973).

b. VIOLATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: See, U.S. vs. SOTO, 132 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1997) Key Note 4, ([C]ounsel's failure to request downward sentence adjustment under Sentencing Guideline provision for minimal or minor participation rendered assistance CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE; FAILURE TO RAISE POTENTIALLY HELPFUL PROVISION FELL OUTSIDE PROFESSIONAL STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE, AND ERROR PREJUDICED DEFENDANT, . . .), Key Note 6, ([Whether lawyers get Sentencing Guidelines wrong by MISINTERPRETING IMPLICATION OF PARTICULAR PROVISION or by failing to raise potentially helpful provision altogether, such DRASTIC MISSTEPS CLEARLY SATISFY PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS PORTION OF TEST FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM: they amount to errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed defendant by Sixth Amendment.) (SOTO satisfied STRICKLAND's prejudice test as well: There is a "REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT, BUT FOR COUNSEL'S UNPROFESSIONAL ERRORS, THE RESULT OF THE PROCEEDING WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.") Id. at 59.

c. U.S. vs. GORDON, 156 F.3d 376 (2nd Cir. 1998), The Second Circuit held that: (1) defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at

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PLEA NEGOTIATIONS when defense counsel grossly underestimated defendants' potential maximum sentence, and (2) district court did not abuse it discretion in ORDERING NEW TRIAL AS REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. Key Note 5, [D]efense counsel's performance in grossly underestimating defendants' SENTENCING EXPOSURE IN LETTER TO DEFENDANT fell below prevailing professional norms for advising criminal defendant DURING PLEA NEGOTIATIONS. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6), Key note 6. (Reasonable probability existed that, BUT FOR defense counsel's unprofessional error in grossly underestimating that defendant's maximum sentence exposure was ten years, defendant would have accepted guilty plea offer, even if court and government had advised defendant before trial that he faced minimum sentence of ten years, where actual maximum sentence was approximately 27 years, and defendant stated that BUT FOR his counsel's advise he would have accepted whatever plea had been offered.)

d. RULE 11(c) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: See, U.S. vs. WATLEY, 987 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1993), Key Note 2, (D]efendants' guilty plea was rendered involuntary by INCORRECT INFORMATION received by defendant BEFORE AND AT GUILTY PLEA HEARING ABOUT POSSIBLE SENTENCE, and by failure to advise defendant about peculiar interplay of Sentencing Guidelines and STATUTORY PRESCRIPTIONS, .). The Court also stated, "ACCEPTANCE OF A GUILTY PLEA IS CONTROLLED BY RULE 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides in relevant part: (c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty [defendants' attorney and] the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: (1) the nature of the charge to which the PLEA is offered, THE MANDATORY MINIMUM PROVIDED BY LAW, if any, and the MAXIMUM POSSIBLE PENALTY PROVIDED BY LAW, INCLUDING THE EFFECTS OF ANY SPECIAL PAROLE OR SUPERVISED RELEASE TERM, the fact that the court is required to consider any applicable sentencing

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guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances . . ." Id. at 845.


25. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of a specific FACT or IS . See, THOMAS vs. D'ANGELO, (1974, Del. Sup) 320 A2d 729. Res Judicata on the other hand applies to bar relitigation on the same issues or those that could have been raised between the identical parties and where the prior litigation resulted in a judgement. See, WILLE vs. MAIER, (1931) 256 NY 465, 176 NE 841; PRESCOTT vs. COPPAGE, (1972) 266 Md 562, 296 A2d 150. Thus, the defense of res judicata is rarely raised in a legal malpractice action since the attorney would have had to be a party to the underlying proceeding. See, MASTERS vs. DUNSTAN, (1962) 256 NC 520, 124 SE2d 574.

26. Plaintiff fails to understand why defendant's request this court to bar his malpractice claims under res judicata when defendants' where not party to the underlying proceedings. See, defendants' requested ORDER, under CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, paragraph two (2).

27. Plaintiff's past claims did not involve a determination as to whether the Attorneys/defendants' were negligent; thus, previous judgements did not preclude a legal malpractice action against attorneys. See, TORRES vs. NELSON, (Fla App D3) 448 So 2d 1058. See also, COOK vs. CONNOLLY, (Minn.) 366 NW2d 287, (malpractice action was an independent cause of act~on which was not subsumed in the plaintiff's personal injury action, andCOLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DID NOT BAR THE MALPRACTICE ACTION.


28. Plaintiff is incorporating ALL past filings in this proceeding

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which include all filings within his underlying criminal action, U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 4-89-82(05), which specifically include plaintiff's §2255 as to his RESENTENCING on Count One (1), dated January 4, l999, that was denied due to lack of jurisdiction, not on the merits. See, MINNESOTA LOCAL RULE 10.03 and F.R.C.P. 10(c).


29. Defendants' violated professional standards portion of test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim as guaranteed plaintiff by the Sixth Amendment during PLEA NEGOTIATIONS on Count One (l) by grossly overstating plaintiffs maximum sentence by not investigating the STATUTE, UNEXTRADITED CRIMES THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE UNITED STATES TO USE TO INCREASE PLAINTIFF'S SENTENCE (15 years), INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WITHIN INDICTMENT TO SUPPORT COUNT ONE DUE TO AGGREGATION OF COUNTS TO MEET §841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (see, issue 4 within in Resentencing §2255), ARTICLE 75 OF THE BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL CODE THAT LIMITS THE MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE TO THIRTY (30) YEARS, AND LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF AS ACTS OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ARE NOT CRIMES IN BRAZIL.

30. BUT FOR the above violations, plaintiff would of received some distinct advantage, including the reasonable proability that plaintiff would of been offered a plea offer less than seven (7) years and/or Count One (1) would of been dismissed.

31. PLEASE NOTE: Defendant Charles Faulkner stated to Plaintiff verbally that the U.S. Attorney's office would recommend a seven (7) year sentence if plaintiff signed the written plea agreement. The written plea agreement DOES NOT state same and plaintiff was never told same by any person from the U.S. Attorneys Office. Plaintiff had continually advised defendant Faulkner that Brazilian law does not authorize a sentence over thirty (30) years, ARTICLE 75 OF THE BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL CODE LLMITS THE MAXLMUM SENTENCE IN BRAZIL TO THIRTY (30) YEARS. Also, DEA Agent John Boulger stated to plaintiff, in person at the Anoka County Jail,

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BEFORE TRIAL, that plaintiff COULD NOT receive a mandatory life sentence without parole.


32. Defendants' violated professional standards portion of test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim as guaranteed plaintiff by the Sixth Amendment when Defendants' accepted money from Plaintiff's family for payment of legal services, when defendants' where court-appointed attorneys. See, generally, American Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106; American Bar Association, Standards for the Defense Function, Standard 3.3 (2d ed. 1980). See, HARRIS vs. HOUSEWRIGHT, 697 F.2d 202, Z06 (8th Cir. 1982).

33. BUT FOR the above violations, plaintiff's family would not of been forced to pay legal bills incurred by Defendants' due to defendants' failure to learn the facts and familiarize himself with the law in relation to the Plaintiff's case. DB 6-lO1(A)(1) of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Res possibility provides, "A lawyer shall not . . . handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it." See, HARRIS, Id. at 205; It is the duty of an attorney who is a general practitioner to refer his client to a specialist or recommend the assistance of a specialist if under the circumstances a reasonable careful and skillful practitioner were to do so. See, HORNE vs. PECKHAM, 97 Cal App 3d 404, 158 Cal Rptr 714. Defendants' had not experience in international law, thus it was necessary to consult with National Legal Professional Associates due to there international representation of clients in extradition cases. NLPA's office in London, England handles most of the international extradition cases. Plaintiff does not know if Defendants' collected money from the public defenders office as to costs incurred by the Lambros family to pay National Legal Professional Assoc.

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34. Defendants' violated professional standards portion of test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and/or negligence when defendants refused to HIRE A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR. See, U.S. vs. GRAY, 78 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. l989) (Trial counsel's failure to hire an investigator to track down potential witnesses, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.) (Attorney admitted that he did not visit the SCENE OF THE INCIDENT or make any other effort to locate potential witnesses. Moreover, he made no attempt to HIRE AN INVESTIGATOR to search for such witnesses, although he was aware that he could have MADE MOTION TO OBTAIN FUNDS TO HIRE SUCH AN INVESTIGATOR. Finally, Witheral acknowledged that he had made no discovery requests other than an informal call to the prosecuting attorney to obtain whatever information he had. Id. at 709); MILLER vs. WAINWRIGHT, 79 F.2d 426 (llth Cir. 19~6) (Trial counsel's failure to renew motion for appointment of private investigator, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); HARRIS BY AND THROUGH RAMSEYER vs. WOOD, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)(Trial Counsel's FAILURE TO RETAIN INVESTIGATOR to interview witness amounted to ineffective assistance.)

35. BUT FOR the above violations of NOT HIRING AN INVESTIGATOR, plaintiff WOULD NOT BE IN PRISON, AS THE CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS/CONTRACTORS IN BRAZIL WAS SO OUTRAGEOUS THAT DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES WOULD ABSOLUTELY BAR THE GOVERNMENT FROM INVOKING JUDICIAL PROCESSES TO OBTAIN A CONVICTION, ct. ROCHIN vs. CALIFORNIA, 342 U.S. 165, quoting, U.S. vs. TOSCANINO, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (19/4). As stated within prior documents, plaintiff was tortured within a U.S.built torture center in Brasilia, Brazil, brain control implants inserted, forced interrogated that continues to this day due to telemetry system established in Brazil for political control, and held with FRANCISO TOSCANINO while both of us were being tortured. Plaintiff begged Defendant Charles Faulkner to contact his Brazilian attorneys as

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to the torture center plaintiff was held in and clarification as to Brazilian law applicable to Plaintiff's extradition in the areas of THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY, STANDING TO BASE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALITY, and THE DUAL CRIMINALITY DOCTRINE. Also to contact newspaper reporters that visited FRANCESCO TOSCANINO, video coverage taken, and met plaintiff TWICE AT THE TORTURE FACILITY IN BRASILIA, BRAZIL. Defendants would not even contact Francesco Toscanino's lawyer that visited Toscanino when we were jailed together, Dr. Julio Cardella, Campinas, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Please refer to EXHIBIT AAA-l thru 6, within plaintiff's AMENDED COMPLAINT. (actual newspaper article is exhibit AAA-6).


36. Defendant's violated professional standards portion of test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim as guaranteed plaintiff by the Sixth Amendment and/or negligence when Defendants' ACCEPTED MONEY from Plaintiff's family for payment of legal services and psychological services, when defendants' where court-appointed attorneys. Specifically, Attorney Jeff Orren and Dr. Kenneth Criqui. See, CLAIM TWO (2) within this pleading as to law to support this argument.

37. BUT FOR the above violations, plaintiff's family and plaintiff would not of been forced to pay legal and medical bills incurred by Defendants' failure to learn the facts and familiarize himself with the law in relation to Plaintiff's case. See, CLAIM TWO (2) within this pleading as to law to support this argument. Plaintiff does not know if Defendants' requested funds from the public defenders office as to costs incurred. See, U.S. vs. FESSEL, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976) (Trial counsel's failure to utilize Title 18, U.S.C. §3006(a) to obtain the FUNDS for an expert at the government's expense, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, defendant had been examined by examined by a doctor BEFORE HIS ARREST AND OTHER DOCTORS AFTER HIS ARREST, whose

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reports indicated that defendant was incompetent. However, trial counsel failed to investigate or prepare to present an insanity defense, which deprived defendant of a chance to present psychiatric testimony.); LOYD vs. WHITLEY, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (Trial counsel's failure to move the court for FUNDS for independent expert psychiatrist constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.)


38. Defendants' violated professional standards portion of test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim as guaranteed plaintiff by the Sixth Amendment and/or negligence when defendants FAILED TO file motions suppressing testimony obtained in violation of Title 18 USC §201(b)(2), (b)(3) & (c)(2) and MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Also defendants' failed to request an ACCOMPLICE/INFORMANT JURY INSTRUCTION. See, VOYLES vs. WATKINS, 489 F.Supp. 901 (1980) (Trial counsel's failure to request an accomplice jury instruction for the key prosecution's witness' testimony to be scrutinized with caution and suspicion, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and constituted "cause" for failure to raise the issue.) Witness testimony included, (a) Pebbles, (b) Greer, (c) Lemon, and (d) Ayd. Also see, HENRY vs. SCULLY, 78 F.3d 51 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Trial counsel's ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to admission of codefendant's confession as evidence against defendant, failed to object to hearsay testimony explaining why defendant did not possess drugs and failing to request missing witness charge with respect to confidential informant who did not testify at trial.)

39. BUT FOR the above violations, plaintiff would of received some distinct advantage, including the REASONABLE PROBABILITY that plaintiff would not have been found guilty as the total pages of testimony from PEBBLES, GREER, LEMON, and AYD is approximately 354 pages from the total pages of Plaintiff's 959 pages of total transcript. Please refer to Plaintiff's RESENTENCING §2255,

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dated January 4, 1999, ISSUE FIVE (5), pages 37 thru 43, and Exhibits P, Q, R, & S.


40. Plaintiff will address this issue later in this response.


41. Plaintiff is submitting an attached motion for an EXTENSION OF TIME to respond to ISSUES SIX (6) thru FIFTEEN (15), due to lack of typewriter availability in the law library and time available within the law library. The library only has 16 electric correction type typewriters for a population of approximately 1,800 inmates. The other 8 non-correction type typewriters due not allow plaintiff to correct mistakes that are brought about by the Brazilian Nazi's that control me. Plaintiff has contacted the Catholic Church in Brazil and at the Vatican to no avail.

42. Plaintiff is requesting a ten (10) day extension of time to May 24, 1999. Thanking this Court in advance for the favorable consideration.

43. Plaintiff hereby states under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Title 28 USC §1746.

DATED: May 11, 1999


Reg. No. 00436-124
USP Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000, USA

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For more information write (snail mail) JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS directly at:

Prisoner No. 00436-124
U. S. Penitentiary Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, KS 66048-1000